Public Accounts Committees by PELIZZO, Riccardo & Stapenhurst, Rick
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
1-2006
Public Accounts Committees
Riccardo PELIZZO
Singapore Management University, riccardop@smu.edu.sg
Rick Stapenhurst
World Bank Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
PELIZZO, Riccardo and Stapenhurst, Rick, "Public Accounts Committees" (2006). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper
81.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/81
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/81
 
 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL SCIENCES, SMU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Accounts Committees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Riccardo Pelizzo, Rick Stapenhurst 
January 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper No. 01-2006 
SMU  SOCIAL  SCIENCES  &  HUMANITIES    
WORKING  PAPER  SERIES 
Public Accounts Committees 
 
Riccardo Pelizzo, Singapore Management University 
Rick Stapenhurst, World Bank Institute 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The collapse of many authoritarian regime in the course of what Samuel Huntington 
called “the third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) and the democratic 
transitions in Eastern and Central Europe, in Latin America and in Asia, have generated, 
among political scientists, an increasing interest for what Giovanni Sartori calls 
“constitutional engineering” (Sartori, 1994a)1. Political scientists have started paying 
new and increasing attention to  which institutions are more likely to lead to the 
consolidation of the democracies that had emerged in the course of the third wave 
Stepan and Skach, 1994:119). Specifically, political scientists have investigated whether, 
and to what extent, democratic consolidation or democratic collapse are affected by a 
specific type of institutional arrangement, that is the form of government. 
In the course of this debate several positions have emerged. Juan Linz (1994) 
has underlined that the presidential form of government (because of its rigidity and of 
the dual legitimacy of the executive and the legislative) is less likely to sustain 
democracy and, henceforth, that the parliamentary form of government is the form of 
                                                 
1 A transition is the period between the crisis or the collapse of a political regime and the establishment of 
a new one. A transition is a democratic transition when it ends with the establishment of a democratic 
regime. A democratic transition is also called democratization. There is a wave of democratization when 
the number of countries in transition from a non-democratic system to a democratic one outnumbers the 
countries moving in the opposite direction. See Huntington (1991:15). 
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government that best suits democracy and contributes to a democracy’s consolidation. 
Przeworski and others (1997:301) have provided extensive empirical evidence that 
supports Linz’ s argument and have in fact shown, on the basis of their statistical 
analyses, that the probability of a democratic breakdown in countries with a presidential 
form of government is three times as high as it is in countries with a parliamentary form 
of government. Scott Mainwaring has, instead, pointed out that the survival of 
democratic regimes is in danger only when the presidential form of government is 
coupled with a hyper-fragmented party system (Mainwaring, 1993: 198-228)2.  
  While political scientists have investigated which forms of government are more 
likely to ensure the survival of democratic regimes, several international organizations 
have also started investigating, with a different focus, the relationship between 
democracy and institutions. Specifically, international organization such as the World 
Bank Institute (WBI) or the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have 
started paying increasing attention to parliaments and legislatures and to the role that 
these institutions can play in consolidating democracy, improving governance, curbing 
corruption, and, ultimately reducing poverty (National Democratic Institute, 200; 
Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2002; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 
2004b; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). 
                                                 
2 This evidence has led many political scientists to believe that the presidential form of government is less 
likely to sustain the survival of a democratic regime and that, therefore, parliamentarism is the best for of 
democratic government. Giovanni Sartori (1994a; 1994b:107) has noted that the fact that presidentialism 
is not good for democracy does not make parliamentarism the ‘good alternative’. Parliamentary 
governments may be very unstable, very inefficient and their instability and ineffectiveness may lead in 
the end to a regime breakdown. Historically this has been the case, for example, of the Weimar Republic 
of the French Fourth Republic, of the Spanish Republic—on this see Sartori (1976) or Pelizzo-Babones 
(2005).  A critical assessment of the criticisms of presidentialism can be found in Shugart and Carey 
(1992:28-54).  
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 The approach to the study of legislatures adopted by international organizations 
in fairly interesting. These organization acknowledge that modern political systems are 
characterized by a sort of “executive dominance” or “executive preeminence”. This 
means that governments  have the political and the legislative initiative –they have the 
competence, the information, the know-how to analyze pressing problems and 
formulate policies and solutions. Meanwhile, parliaments and legislatures perform more 
of an oversight function. They need to evaluate the virtues (or the lack thereof) of 
government policies, to keep governments in check, to prevent governments from 
abusing of their power, to assess the merits of governments’ legislative proposals, to 
examine these proposals, and to vote, amend, approve and at times reject these 
proposals. In addition to this ex ante oversight function, oversight which is exercised 
before a certain policy is enacted, parliaments and legislatures also perform a ex post 
oversight function. Parliaments and legislatures are in charge of overseeing policy 
implementation. Parliaments need to make sure that policies are implemented as they 
were approved by the legislature.  
 This point has an obvious implication as it suggests that the international 
organizations believe that legislatures and parliaments are less capable to initiate 
policies than they were in the past, but that they counterbalance this loss of political 
initiative by performing an increasing oversight role. International organizations have 
started paying increasing attention to which institutional instruments may actually help 
legislators and legislatures to oversee governments’ actions and activities (National 
Democratic Institute, 200; Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2002; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 
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2004a; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). The 
international organizations’ interest for Public Accounts Committees (PACs) originated 
in this context. In the course of the paper, after discussing what are the PACs, how they 
are instituted and institutionalized, and what functions they perform, we will analyze 
some survey data collected by the WBI in collaboration with SARFM to assess the good 
functioning of the PACs and what factors make it possible. 
 
Public Accounts Committees 
 
PACs are one of the instruments that parliaments can use to check the governments’ 
activities3. These commissions, first instituted in the United Kingdom by a resolution of 
the House of Commons in 1861, are now fairly common in the countries of the 
Commonwealth. The PACs are parliamentary standing committees of the Lower House. 
But there are of course some exceptions to this general trend. In Australia and in India, 
the PAC is a bicameral commission.  
 The existence of the PACs can be institutionalized in different ways. First of all, 
the existence of a PAC can be established by a country’s constitution. This is, for 
example, the case of Antigua and Barbuda (art. 98 of the 1981 Constitution), of 
Bangladesh (art. 76 of the 1972 Constitution), of the Cook Islands (art. 71(3) of the 
                                                 
3 Although they are generally called Public Accounts Committees, the PAC may sometimes take different 
names. For example in the Seychelles, they are called Committees of finances and public accounts (art. 
104(1a) of the Constitution. In the Cook Islands the PACs are called Public Expenditures Committees 
(art.71 (3) of the Constitution). However, it is important to note that in spite of the fact that they may 
assume different names, the PACs all perform the same set of functions as it will be shortly be 
demonstrated. 
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Constitution), of Kiribati (art. 115 of the Constitutions), of the Seychelles (art. 104(1a) 
of the Constitution), of Saint Vincent (art. 76 of the 1979 Constitution), of Trinidad and 
Tobago (art. 119 of the 1976 Constitution) and of Zambia (art. 103(5) of the 
Constitution)4. There is a second group of countries in which the existence of the PAC 
is institutionalized by the standing order of the assembly. The PAC was instituted 
respectively by the art. 70(2) of the Standing Order of the Parliament in Guyana, by the 
art. 89 of the Standing Orders in Tanzania, by the art. 122 (1) of the Standing Orders in 
Uganda, by the art. 108(3) of the Standing Orders in Canada and by the art. 120E of the 
Standing Orders in Malta, by the art. 69 of the Standing Orders in Jamaica and by the 
articles 308 and 309 of the Rules of Procedures in India. There is also a third group of 
countries, among which Australia and the United Kingdom, in which the PAC is 
instituted by an Act of the Parliament—respectively the Public Accounts and Audit 
Committee Act 1951 in Australia consolidated on November 6, 1997 and the National 
Audit Act in the United Kingdom. 
 The size of the membership of the PAC varies from country to country. There 
are seven members in Malta, seventeen in Canada and twenty-two in India5. 
Interestingly, and in spite of the size of the membership, the distribution of seats within 
the PAC corresponds, as much as possible, to the distribution of seats in the whole 
assembly. This means that the government party (or the government coalition) controls 
a majority of the seats in the PAC. 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that the PAC in Trinidad and Tobago is established by the art. 119 of the Constitution 
and by the art. 72 of the Standing Orders. 
5 Of these 22 members, 15 are members of the Lok Sahba and 7 are members of the Rajya Sahba. 
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  To counterbalance the power of the majority in the PAC, the opposition party is 
generally given the Chairmanship of the PAC itself. In this respect David McGee noted 
that “in two-thirds of the cases PACs are chaired by an opposition members” (McGee, 
2002:66). McGee underlines that this practice is, in some countries such as the United 
Kingdom or India, the results of “a very strong convention” (McGee, 2002:66). In other 
countries this practice is codified by the same norms and rules that establish the PAC 
itself. For example, the art. 120E(4) of the Standing Orders of Malta’s Parliament 
establishes “one of the members nominated by the Leader of the Opposition and so 
designated by him in consultation with the Leader of the House shall be appointed as 
Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee”. In a similar vein art. 87(5) of the 
Standing Orders of the Tanzanian Parliament establishes that “the Chairperson for the 
Public Account Committee shall be elected from amongst the Members of the 
Committee from the Opposition”. 
 The fact that that the Chairmanship of the PAC is given to the opposition 
performs two basic functions. First of all it re-equilibrates the balance of power between 
the government and the opposition. Second, it performs a symbolic function. The fact 
that the Chairperson of the PACs is a member of the opposition indicates the 
willingness of both the majority and the minority to operate, within the PAC, in a 
perfectly  bipartisan manner. 
Australia represents an interesting exception to this general trend. In Australia, 
the Chairperson of the PAC is generally an MP from the parliamentary majority. This 
choice is motivated by the fact that “in Australia it is considered advantageous to have a 
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government Member as Chair, as this can assist with the implementation of the PAC’s 
recommendations. It is regarded as the duty of the Chair to advocate that the PAC’s 
recommendations be taken up and implemented by the government. This can involve 
behind the scenes work persuading reluctant ministers to act. A government Member 
can do this more effectively than an opposition Member who as political opponent will 
not have the confidence of the ministers” (McGee, 2002:66). 
 
Role and Functions of the PACs 
 
It was previously noted that the PACs are standing committees which help the 
Parliament oversee the activities performed by the Government. 
A PAC has, like any other standing committee, the power to investigate and examine all 
the issues that are referred to it by the parliament6. The PAC can also investigate some 
specific issues such as the government’ accountability to the Parliament with regard to 
the expenses approved by the government; the effectiveness and the efficiency of the 
policies enacted by the government; and the quality of the administration. 
 To do this, the PAC is given additional, and more specific powers, such as the 
power to examine the public accounts, the comments on the public accounts and all the 
reports drafted by the Auditor General and by the National Audit Office. The PAC has 
also to power to conduct, directly or indirectly, some investigations; to receive all the 
documentation that it considers necessary to adequately perform its functions; to invite 
                                                 
6 Or by the president of the Chamber as in Tanzania. 
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government members to attend the meetings of the PAC and to respond the questions of 
the PAC’s members; to give publicity to their own conclusions; to report to the 
Parliament and to suggest to government, when this is considered necessary, how to 
modify its course of action. 
 
The Success of the PACs 
 
Until not very long ago, very little was known about the effectiveness of the PACs. No 
comparative study had systematically investigated whether, and to what extent, the 
Public Account Committees actually contributed to an effective oversight of the 
government activities and expenses. A recent research  conducted by the WBI, in 
collaboration with the SARFM, has generated fairly interesting survey data. These 
survey data can be used to perform two tasks. First, these data can be used to assess 
which results are actually achieved by the PACs, but also the conditions. Second these 
data can be used to assess which conditions and factors help PACs work and work well. 
 The WBI and SARFM surveyed 33 Chairs of various Public Accounts 
Committees from national and sub-national parliaments from various countries of the 
Commonwealth. The data generated in the course of this survey are presented and 
discussed in the following pages. 
 Beginning with the analysis of the data concerning the success of the PACs, it is 
important to note that the success rate varies quite significantly depending on the nature 
of the results that a PAC wants to achieve. For example, while almost 79 percent of the 
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Chairperson surveyed in the study reported that the recommendation formulated by the 
PAC are frequently accepted by the government, less than 64 percent of the respondents 
stated that the recommendations formulated by the PAC are frequently implemented. 
Conversely, while only 15 percent of the respondents reports that the PAC’s 
recommendations are rarely accepted, more than 27 percent of the respondents indicates 
that the recommendation formulated by the PAC are rarely implemented by the 
government. Data are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Results achieved by the PAC: how frequently has the PAC achieved the 
following result? Result achieved 
Result achieved Frequently Rarely of N 
Recommendations accepted 78.8 15.2 33 
Recommendations implemented 63.6 27.3 33 
Better information 60.8 18.2 33 
Disciplinary action 27.3 15.2 33 
Modification of legislation 15.2 54.5 33 
 
The analysis of the data suggests some additional considerations. For more than 60 
percent of the respondents, the government frequently provides better information to the 
parliament in the light of the PAC’s recommendations. It is however quite rare that the 
actions, suggestions and recommendations of the PAC lead to a disciplinary action 
against public officials who have violated the existing rules and norms. Less than one-
third of the respondents reported that a disciplinary action occurs frequently in the wake 
of the PAC’s recommendation. It is also worth noting that the government rarely 
modifies its legislation and legislative proposals in the light of the PAC’s 
recommendations and suggestions. 
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The Determinants of PAC’s Success 
 
The survey conducted by the WBI in collaboration with SARFM does not simply ask 
whether, to what extent and in what respect PACs are effective or successful, but it also 
attempted to assess which conditions facilitate the functioning and the success of the 
PACs themselves. 
 To gather the appropriate information from the respondents, the survey 
administrators gave the respondents a list. The list included 37 factors which could be 
considered as possible determinants of the PAC’s success and respondents were asked 
to indicate how much importance they attached to each of these factors, that is whether 
they considered the factors to be very important, somewhat important or not important. 
These factors fell into one of the following three categories: the composition of the 
commission, the powers of the commission and the practices of the commission. 
Respondents were also asked to name which conditions could prevent the successful 
functioning of a PAC.  
Composition of the Commission 
Only two of the 37 factors mentioned in the list given to the respondents belong to this 
category. The first factor is the ‘balanced representation of all major political parties in 
the commission”, while the second factor is “exclusion of government members from 
the commission”. 
 The importance of this second factor is fairly clear. The mission of a PAC is to 
investigate the activities of the government especially with regard to the use of public 
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funds and resources. In order to perform its oversight activity, the PAC has to be free to 
conduct its business without any government interference. This condition (freedom 
from government interference)  would be quite difficult to achieve, if government 
members were also serving as member of the PAC. If some MPs, already serving in the 
cabinet, were allowed to serve on the PAC, they might try to slow down or mislead the 
investigative action of the commission in order to protect the cabinet in which they also 
serve. But this is not the only problem. Even assuming that MPs, serving in the cabinet, 
do not mislead or slow down the PAC in the performance of its duties, their 
membership in the PAC would pose nonetheless a problem for the proper functioning of 
the committee. 
 The study by McGee (2002) revealed that PACs are not the most appealing 
commissions on which MPs can serve. Some MPs actually fear that serving in a PAC 
requires a lot of work without providing much visibility, that membership in a PAC is 
not adequately rewarded at the ballot box, and that there is therefore no electoral 
incentive to serve on a PAC. The absence of electoral incentives are also coupled with 
the absence of partisan incentives (or the presence of partisan disincentives). MPs fear 
that serving in a PAC can put them in trouble with their own respective parties. MPs, 
belonging to the majority party (or coalition) often worry that serving in a PAC might 
force them to choose between loyally serving the party (by not performing the 
committee duties) and loyally serving the PAC (and alienating their own party). If MPs 
with appointments in the cabinet were allowed to serve in the PAC, their presence in the 
committee would provide an incentive to the younger MPs to favor the partisan interests 
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over the interests of the committee itself. The committee would end up functioning in a 
very partisan manner. Alternatively the PAC would become totally unable to function 
as it should. This is so because the composition of the committee is fairly proportional, 
it reflects the distribution of seats in the assembly as a whole, and in parliamentary 
systems the government party (or coalition) controls the majority of the parliamentary 
seats. Hence, as soon as the PAC starts operating in a partisan fashion, the government 
would constantly be able to control the PAC and would, in this way, be quite able to 
avoid the parliamentary oversight.  
 There is also a third reason why cabinet ministers (and under-secretaries) should 
not be allowed to serve in a PAC. Even assuming that the presence of government 
officials in the PAC does not, negatively, affect the functioning of the PAC, it certainly 
affect the credibility of the PAC itself and that of its deliberations—which are the 
PAC’s true assets. For these reasons, government members should not be allowed to 
serve in the PAC. 
Table 2. Success and Composition of the PAC. How important is this factor? 
Percentages 
Factor Very 
Important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Proportional representation of the 
various parliamentary parties  
86.2 10.3 3.4 29 
Exclusion of MPs with cabinet posts 85.2 14.8 0 27 
 
The data presented in the second table provide a fairly interesting picture. Although 
some of the respondents have not assessed whether the composition of the PAC is an 
important condition for the PAC’s success, an overwhelming majority of them indicated 
that the composition of the PAC is a crucial factor in making PACs work and work well. 
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Excluding MPs serving in the cabinet from the PAC is considered important or very 
important by respectively 14.8 and 85.2 percent. Similarly, the proportional 
representation of parliamentary parties in the PAC is considered to be important or very 
important by 10.3 and 86.2 percent of the respondents. Interestingly, while more than  3 
percent of the respondents said that proportional representation of parties in the PAC is 
not important, none of the respondents considered the exclusion of government 
members as non important. Further details are presented in Table 2. 
 
Powers of the Committee 
 
The questionnaire, used in the survey, asked the 33 PAC-Chairs to say how important 
were certain powers and/or characteristics for the success of the PAC. Respondents 
were given a list of 17 powers or characteristics, and respondents were asked to say 
whether these powers were very important, important or not important. 
 The analysis of the survey data reveals that the importance of some powers or 
characteristics are almost unanimously acknowledged by the respondents. For example, 
the power to formulate suggestions and to publish them, the power to choose which 
topics should be investigated without having to accept orders or suggestions from the 
government, the power to investigate all the current and the past expenses deliberated 
by the executive are powers that are nearly unanimously considered as important or 
very important. All respondents also considered as important or very important that the 
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PAC should have a clear focus on keeping the government accountable for the use of 
public money. 
 It is however to note that while a large percentage of respondents does not 
consider of any importance whether the PAC has the power to summon the cabinet 
ministers or not, they almost unanimously consider  important or very important that the 
PAC has the power to force the witnesses to respond to the PAC’s questions. In fact, 
more than 93 percent of the respondents indicates that the power to force witnesses to 
respond is important or very important. Further details are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Success and Powers of PACs. How Important is this factors? Percentages. 
Power of the Committee Very 
important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Formulate recommendation and 
publish the conclusions  
97 3 0 33 
Investigate all past and present 
expenses  
93.5 6.5 0 31 
Choose topics for investigation 
without following the suggestions of 
the  government 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Focus on keeping government 
accountable for spending 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Force witnesses to answer questions e 87.1 6.45 6.45 33 
Examine the budget of the Legislative 
Auditor 
58.8 35.3 23.5 17 
Force cabinet ministers to appear 
before the committee  
55 15 45 33 
View the proposed legislation or the 
amendments to the Legislative 
Auditor’s Act 
47.8 30.4 21.8 23 
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Success and Practices of the PAC 
 
 
There is a third set of factors that may facilitate the success or the effectiveness of the 
PACs in performing their tasks. This third set of factors is made up of by the practices 
of adopted by the PACs themselves and by their members.  
 In order to identify which practices and dynamics could improve the 
performance of the PACs and make them more successful, the survey conducted by the 
WBI and the SARFM asked respondents to assess the importance of the 18 practices 
listed in the questionnaire. 
 Two practices were considered to be particularly important for the success of the 
PACs. Respondents reported that keeping the records, the proceedings of the meetings 
was one the most important ways to improve the PAC’s performance. Respondents also 
noted that the PAC’s performance was greatly enhanced when the members of the PAC 
did their homework before attending the PAC’s meetings. Both practices were 
considered as important or very important by 97 percent of the respondents. We can 
also note that keeping the transcripts of the sessions is considered to be slightly more 
important than doing the homework (before the meetings). In fact, while preparation 
for/before the meeting is considered as very important by 78.8 percent of the 
respondents, keeping the transcripts is considered to be very important by 87.9 percent 
of the respondents. 
 The existence of procedures and mechanisms to assess whether the government 
actually implements the recommendations formulated by the PAC is also considered as 
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an important condition for the success of the PAC. The existence of such procedures is 
considered to be important or very important by more than 93 percent of the 
respondents. Further details can be found in Table 4. 
 Bipartisanship and the bipartisan functioning of the PAC is considered to be the 
fourth most important practice (or dynamics) for the success of a PAC. More than 90 
percent of the respondents consider as important or very important that there is a close 
working relationship between the committee members regardless of their partisan 
affiliation. 
 This result is fairly interesting especially if it considered in the light of what was 
noted above. The data presented above revealed that the importance of certain powers at 
the disposal of the PACs was unanimously acknowledged. The data also revealed that 
the importance of some characteristics is not unanimously recognized. This is, for 
example, the case of a fair (proportional) representation of the parliamentary parties in 
the PAC itself. Not all PACs’ Chairs consider parliamentary parties’ representation in 
the PAC as a condition for the PAC’s success. Why?  Because the PAC is, by its very 
nature, a committee in which partisan divisions should be sidelined (Rockman, 1984). 
The PAC is a committee that, in order to work and possibily work well, needs to 
function in a bi-partisan or rather non-partisan manner7. This point is fairly important. If 
the MPs serving in the PAC must behave in a non-partisan fashion, the importance of 
                                                 
7 In order to create this close working relationship between PACs’ members from the various parties, 
some parliaments request that all the PAC’s decisions be taken by unanimity. According to McGee 33 
percent of the national and sub-national parliaments in Commonwealth request that the PAC’s decision 
be taken by unanimity   McGee (2002:98).   
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their partisan affiliation decreases and, with it, the importance of a proportional 
representation of the various parliamentary parties also decreases.  
 It is however worth noting that not all practices are regarded as important for the 
good functioning or the success of the PACs. As shown by the data presented in Table 5, 
almost one-third of the respondents does not think that the success of the PACs depends 
on the economic incentives provided to the PACs’ members to serve in the PAC. 
 
Table 4. Are Practices and Procedures important for the Success of a PAC? The most 
important practices. (Percentages) 
Pratice of the Commttee very 
important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Keeping the transcripts of the 
meetings 
87.9 9.1 3.0 33 
Preparation before Committee 
Meetings 
78.8 18.2 3.0 33 
Procedures to determine 
whether the government has 
taken any step to implement the 
recommendations of the 
Committee  
75.0 18.7 6.3 32 
Close working relationship 
between the members of the 
various political parties  
75.0 15.6 9.4 32 
 
It is probably more interesting to note that the establishment of sub-committees (to help 
the PACs perform their tasks) is considered as non-important by more than one-third of 
the respondents. Similarly, the respondents tend to agree on the fact that the political 
and the professional experiences of the PAC’s members have no impact on the 
functioning and the success of the PAC. Experience in business or administration is 
considered as non-important by more than one-third of the respondents. Previous 
experiences in other parliamentary committees is considered as non important by almost 
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42 percent of the respondents. Broadcasting the PAC’s meeting is the least important 
practice. A majority of the respondents agreed that broadcasting the PAC’s meetings is 
not important. 
 
 
Table 5. The Least Important Practices and Dynamics for the Successo of the PAC.   
(Percentages). 
Practice of the Committee Not important N 
TV Broadcastingof the meetings  52.0 19 
PAC members with at least 2 years of experience in 
any parliamentary committee  
41.7 24 
PAC members with administrative or business 
experience 
35.7 28 
Creation of sub-committees  35.3 17 
Extra money or additional incentives for  members 
to participate in the meetings scheduled outside the 
normal legislative session 
31.8 22 
 
 
Obstacles to the good functioning of the PAC 
 
 
The data and the results presented in this paper provide useful information with regard 
to which institutional factors facilitate the good functioning and the success of the PACs. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the oversight potential does not always 
nor necessarily translate in effective oversight. The purpose of this section is to identify 
which conditions may prevent the PACs from functioning effectively. 
The first obstacle to the good functioning of the PAC is represented by 
partisanship, that is by the fact that some members of the PAC instead of performing 
their committee duties in a cooperative and non-partisan fashion, operate instead with a 
very partisan spirit and use the investigative powers of the PAC to promote their own 
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political fortunes (along with those of their respective parties). The problem is not due 
to institutional factors, it is a behavioral problem. However, in so far as institutions 
provides incentives for (political) behavior, it is possible to find some institutional 
solutions for these problems. For example, in order to minimize the risk of partisan 
conflicts within the PACs, in many parliaments the PAC’s Chairmanship is assigned to 
a member of the opposition. In the Australian case, where instead the PAC’s 
Chairperson belongs to the majority party, the importance of reaching unanimous 
decisions on the formulation of suggestions and recommendations is greatly emphasized. 
In many cases, in order to minimize partisan tensions within the PAC, it is stressed that 
the mandate of the PAC is not that of assessing the political value or the content of the 
policies enacted by the government, but it is instead that of assessing whether policies 
are implemented in an efficient, and effective manner. None of these solutions is by 
itself sufficient to ensure to promote a bipartisan cooperation and this is why it is 
necessary to take additional steps to ensure the proper functioning of the PAC. What 
can be done? 
Members of the PAC, when they join the PAC, could be asked to underwrite a 
(formal or informal) code of conduct in which they pledge their loyalty to the good, 
non-partisan functioning of the committee. Their word would be, in this regard, binding 
and the PAC’s Chairpersons could use this pledge to induce member to perform their 
functions and respect their institutional duties. 
A second, and more serious, problem for the effectiveness of the PAC’s activity 
is represented by the fact that governments have sometimes little interest (if not open 
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aversion) for the parliamentary oversight of their activities. Sometimes governments 
consider parliamentary oversight as an improper intrusion in their own sphere of 
influence. It other cases governments (and their members) think that PACs (and their 
members) are not sufficiently informed or competent to formulate suggestions, 
criticisms and observations worthy of their attention. It is a very serious problem as it 
indicates a very poor understanding of the functions that executives and legislatives 
perform in parliamentary systems. 
In parliamentary systems, the government has to govern and the parliament has 
to check whether the government is governing well. When governments try to avoid 
parliamentary controls or when governments consider parliamentary controls as mere 
obstacles for the effectiveness of the government action, governments have a rather 
imperfect understanding of the principle. 
This said, it is very important to keep in mind that this imperfect understanding 
represents a problem not only in newly established democracies, or in democratizing 
regimes, which have, by definition, a fairly limited experience in the functioning of 
democratic institutions, but it is also a problem in established and consolidated 
democracies. The Australian case is, in this respect, rather emblematic. Between 1932 
and 1951, the PAC of the Australian Parliament never met because the government – 
which could not see which benefits could come from the meetings of this committee – 
decided that the meetings of this committee were not necessary. This is an important 
problem which can be solved only by inducing the governments to be respectful of the 
PACs and the PAC’s activities. 
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A final observation is, at this point, in order. The good functioning of the PACs 
is seriously threatened (and possibly compromised) in those countries in which 
corruption and other forms of improper behavior (such as the conflict of interests) are 
tolerated. In fact, if there is no demand of good governance – of efficient, effective, 
transparent and honest governance  -- by the civil society, the political class does not 
have any incentive to use the oversight mechanisms to check and possibly improve the 
quality of governance.    
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of this paper was to discuss one of the oversight tools adopted in the 
countries of the Commonwealth—the Public Account Committees. The paper discussed 
what are these committees, how and by whom they are instituted, how they function, 
which results they are able to achieve (and therefore how they influence the political 
system) and, last but not least, which conditions promote the good functioning and the 
success of these committees. 
This analysis was performed on the assumption that parliamentary control of the 
government activities can prevent governments from abusing of their powers. And by 
doing so, parliamentary oversight of government activities, is believed to contribute to 
the promotion of good governance. In other words, in this work, it was assumed that 
parliaments and parliamentarians are the agents of good governance. In many cases, in 
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many countries, this is indeed the case. Parliaments and parliamentarians play an 
important role in the promotion of good governance.  
However, it is important not to forget that while parliaments control the 
governments (and their activities), they must be controlled in their turn. Because, in the 
absence of such control, how would one know whether parliamentary controls of the 
executive are exercised for the good of the country and not for the good of few 
individuals? This is a very important point and should receive more attention. In order 
to ensure the success of the PAC (as well as that of the other instruments of 
parliamentary oversight), the morality (the ethical standards) of the PAC and its 
members must be above any (type of) suspicion. This represents the first step to 
establish a viable system of good governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Bibliography 
 
Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave of Democratization, London, University  of 
Oklahoma Press. 
 
Linz, Juan J. (1994) “Presidential or Parliamentary: Does it make a difference?”, in Juan 
J. Linz e Arturo Valenzuela (a cura di), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 
Baltimora, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-91. 
 
Mainwaring, Scott (1993) “Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy. The Difficult 
Combination”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 26, n. 2, pp. 198-228. 
 
McGee, David G. (2002) The Overseers. Public Accounts Committees and Public 
Spending, London, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, with Pluto Press. 
 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Strengthening Legislative 
Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations”, in Legislative Research Series, paper # 6, 
Washington D.C., 2000. 
 
Pelizzo, Riccardo and Salvatore Babones (2005) “The Political Economy of Polarized 
Pluralism”, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science 
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5-9. 
 
Pelizzo, Riccardo and Rick Stapenhurst (2004a) “Legislatures and Oversight: A Note”, 
in Quaderni di Scienza Politica, anno XI, n. 1, pp. 175-188. 
 
Pelizzo, Riccardo and Rick Stapenhurst (2004b) “Tools for Legislative Oversight: AN 
Empirical Investigation”, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 3388, 
Washington DC, November. 
 
Pelizzo, Riccardo, Rick Stapenhurst and David Olson (eds.) (2004) “Trends in 
Parliamentary Oversight”, World bank Institute Working Paper - Series on 
Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development, Washington DC, October. 
 
Przeworski, Adam et al. (1997) “What Makes Democracy Endure?” in Larry Diamond, 
Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-Mao Tien (eds.) Consolidating the Third 
Wave of Democracies, Baltimora, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 295-311. 
 
Rockman, Bert A. (1984) “Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight”, 
in Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, n. 3, pp. 387-440. 
 
Sartori, Giovani (1976) Parties and Party Systems, New York, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 23
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1994a) , Comparative Constitutional Engineering, New York, New 
York University. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1994b) “Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism” in Juan J. Linz 
e Arturo Valenzuela (a cura di), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Baltimora, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 106-118. 
 
Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey (1992) Presidents and Asemblies. 
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stapenhurst, Rick and Riccardo Pelizzo (2002) “A Bigger Role for Legislatures in 
Poverty Reduction”, Finance & Development. A Quarterly Publication of the 
International Monetary Fund, Vol. 39, n. 4, December, pp. 46-48. 
 
Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1994) “Presidentialism and parliamentarism in 
comparative perspective”, in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of 
Presidential Democracy, Baltimora, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 119-136. 
 24
